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I. INTRODUCTION
THE 747 captain turned his ship onto the departure
runway at Tenerife and began the takeoff roll. Unbe-
knownst to him, another 747 was taxiing in the mist down
the runway. The planes collided at 150 miles per hour.
Five hundred and seventy-seven people died.'
Although the causes of serious aviation incidents take
many forms, the foremost cause is pilot negligence. A pi-
lot may, for example, ignore regulations or fail to exercise
due care. Sometimes, however, there is no lack of care,
but rather a lapse in judgment or a separate instrumental-
ity that causes the pilot to err. Nevertheless, pilot negli-
gence, while not the only cause, is a significant
contributor to aviation accidents.
General aviation encompasses a great diversity of pi-
lots, aircraft, and operations. Therefore, issues of avia-
tion safety cannot focus entirely on large aircraft and
revenue carriers. Moreover, as in other endeavors, negli-
gence law seeks to enhance safety in general aviation.
The variety of aviation issues and the role of tort law in
improving safety, in general, requires a close scrutiny of
the interaction between general aviation and pilot negli-
gence law.
Consequently, the concept of pilot negligence should
'James Reason, The Psychopathology of Everyday Slips, THE SCIENCES, Sept.-Oct.
1984, at 45.
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be revised to integrate the tenets of flying and flight
safety. General aviation is now a large and mature enter-
prise, but development of aviation law demonstrates that
courts lack the basic understanding of the fundamentals
of aviation and their proper application to pilot liability.
One important issue involves how the law of negligence
influences pilots to maintain high levels of safety to avoid
injury. Law may accomplish this goal through principles
of psychology. If pilot negligence law, by design, appro-
priately distributes liability in aircraft accident litigation,
and pilots recognize the distribution as equitable, then pi-
lots attribute blameworthiness to certain conduct, and
consequently avoid that conduct. Thus, it is worthwhile
to evaluate how well certain aspects of present negligence
law define the bases of pilot liability. These aspects in-
clude negligence per se, the negligence standard of care,
liability for pilot mistakes and poor judgment that are not
negligent, res ipsa loquitur, and statutory aviation strict
liability.
The attribution theory of psychology is a link between
pilots and negligence law that may enhance flight safety.
The cornerstone of the theory is that a person attributes
responsibility for an outcome to a preceding event when
the person discerns a causal connection between the two.2
The whole of a person's past experience and attitudes af-
fects the way the person makes attributions.' In the realm
of pilot negligence, the event is some action or omission
by the pilot of the accident aircraft, and the outcome is
legal liability. If the attributor is a pilot, then expertise in
aviation colors the attribution. Hence, if pilot negligence
law imposes liability in a manner consistent with pilots'
views of aviation, then negligence law reinforces safety-
oriented attitudes of pilots.
2 Jos Jaspers, Attribution Theory and Research: The State of the Art, in ATrRIBUTION
THEORY AND RESEARCH: CONCEPTUAL, DEVELOPMENTAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS 3,
4 (Jos Jaspers et al. eds., 1983).
1 Icek Azjen & Martin Fishbein, Relevance and Availability in the Attribution Process,
in ATTRIBUTION THEORY AND RESEARCH: CONCEPTUAL, DEVELOPMENTAL AND SO-
CIAL DIMENSIONS 63, 69 (Jos Jaspers et al. eds., 1983).
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Because some of pilots' safety attitudes derive from avi-
ation regulation, a study of pilot negligence law must ad-
dress negligence per se. The Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) addresses safety issues in two ways.
First, the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) promul-
gated by the FAA to address, among other things, safety
issues are regulatory and demand compliance.4 Docu-
mentary safety literature published by the FAA in the Air-
man's Information Manual (AIM) explains to pilots the
application of FARs in various situations. In addition,
supplementary advisory circulars provide valuable infor-
mation on safety. 5 All of these documents require consid-
eration under pilot negligence law.
When the FARs are not applicable to a situation, the
law must judge a pilot's actions based on a second aspect
of negligence law: the generalized standard of care. Fly-
ing is a very specialized activity, and the standard of care
for pilots should reflect this fact. The generic standard of
care, however, contains no informed definitions of the
care or expertise required for the proper operation of air
vehicles. A plethora of data, though, is available regard-
ing aircraft accidents and their causes.6 Lessons learned
from past accidents are beneficial to fashioning a proper
standard of care in pilot negligence law.
Pilot negligence law must also recognize that pilot neg-
ligence is not the sole cause of all aircraft accidents.
Although pilot mistakes and poor judgment may cause
aircraft accidents, this type of human error does not con-
stitute negligent behavior. Nonetheless, if a pilot has
been negligent in causing a mistake, then reducing the
negligent conduct enhances aviation safety. Specifically,
there may be pilots other than the accident aircraft pilot
who could be legally responsible for the mistake in ques-
tion. Thus, pilot negligence law must also address these
individuals.
4 Wood v. United States, 14 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,821, 17,823 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
5 In re N-500L Cases, 691 F.2d 15, 28 (1st Cir. 1982).
6 See, e.g., NTSB ANNUAL REVIEW OF ACCIDENT DATA (published annually).
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An additional aspect of negligence law that bears on pi-
lot liability is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Certainly, res
ipsa loquitur is applied in American negligence law because
it is quite useful. General aviation, however, is a special
form of human endeavor, and it requires properly tailored
legal rules. Here, the issue is whether res ipsa loquitur, a
general negligence rule, has a role in the special category
of pilot negligence. As with the pilot's standard of care,
past aircraft accidents provide the answer.
Finally, the law relating to pilot's actions must address
the issue of aviation strict liability. The early history of
aviation law still affects present pilot negligence law. At
the same time, technology and necessity have changed the
nature of flying. Hence, legal attitudes toward flying that
are half a century old are now vestigial. It is time to de-
cide whether to condemn those attitudes to history.
In all, many facets of pilot negligence law may benefit
from an educated overhaul. The initial step is to gather
the tools for the job, beginning with a hypothesis to form
a bridge between pilot negligence law and greater flight
safety. When combined with data regarding past aircraft
accidents, such a hypothesis will provide a useful evalua-
tion of the various bases for pilot liability.
II. HYPOTHESIS: IF NEGLIGENCE LAW CLOSELY




If aviation negligence law accurately conforms to the
nature and diversity of general aviation, then the law in-
duces pilots to be safe. The basis of this principle is that
all aircraft accidents are traceable to some form of human
error. Therefore, all accidents are avoidable if human er-
ror is removed. As Tom Wolfe stated, "[tihere are no ac-
cidents and no fatal flaws in the machines; there are only
1993] 1093
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pilots with the wrong stuff."' 7 Aviation law can diminish
pilot error by using psychological attribution theory to
make pilots aware that they are the source of human er-
ror, and therefore, they can control and eliminate the er-
ror. Specifically, the theory appeals to the attributional
functions of control, self-esteem, and self-presentation in
pilots.' Negligence law tailored to these functions may in-
duce safe and nonerroneous conduct.
Generally, attribution theory suggests that an individ-
ual's perceptions of the causal relations between events
and their effects influences how that individual adjusts be-
havior to achieve desired results. In particular, an individ-
ual perceives effects as being modifiable if the individual
sees the triggering event as emanating from the individ-
ual's personal free will. 9 Each perceived event adds infor-
mation to an individual's beliefs. These personal beliefs
are internally consistent within the individual, and the in-
dividual revises beliefs in an orderly fashion upon the re-
ceipt of new attributional information.'" Thus, the world
surrounding an individual influences the individual's
behavior.
Personal attributions manifest themselves through
three functions that maintain an individual's positive self-
perception, and each has an application to pilots. First,
the control function posits that an individual has a basic
motivation to exert control over the physical and social
world around him or her." By perceiving a link between
an event and its results, an individual attributes the result
to the event. Although an individual may attribute a re-
sult to either a person or surrounding circumstances, a
personal attribution is more likely than a situational attri-
TOM WOLFE, THE RIGHT STUFF 27 (1979).
Miles Hewstone, Attribution Theory and Common-Sense Explanations: An Introduc-
tory Overview, in ATTRIBUTION THEORY 1, 17 (Miles Hewstone ed., 1983).
9 John Monohan, Abolish the Insanity Defense?-Not Yet, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 719,
721 (1973).
10 Azjen & Fishbein, supra note 3, at 69.
11 Hewstone, supra note 8, at 17.
[58
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bution.' 2 Also, personal attributions are prevalent be-
cause persons are viewed as the "prototype of origins."'' 3
Further, people typically do not see chance as an attribu-
tional category.14 Thus, an individual's motivation to con-
trol is a motivation to create results by personal action
because causal actions originate in persons, and not in sit-
uations or chance.
If pilots perceive that they can control their liability,
then they have a motivation to do so. General aviation
pilots as a group already have a more internalized locus of
control than non-pilots.' 5 That is, pilots feel more per-
sonally responsible for their acts.' 6 If pilots, however,
perceive aviation negligence law as arbitrary and unre-
lated to flying, then pilots do not attribute liability to
themselves, but instead to situations or chance. On the
other hand, if the rules of aviation negligence law are ra-
tional, as perceived by pilots, then pilots attribute liability
to their own actions. Hence, pilot negligence law that re-
lates closely to pilot perceptions of aviation increases
safety.
The second attributional function that affects pilots is
the self-esteem function. An individual is motivated to
protect the individual's self-impression.' 7 Thus, personal
success leads to positive feelings such as pride, and failure
leads to shame.' Overall, the self-esteem function leads
an individual to act in the individual's best interest.
The Health Belief Model illustrates the self-esteem
function at work. "The model postulates that an individ-
ual's decision to undertake health-related actions is gov-
erned by specific health beliefs: namely, the patient's
I2 Id. at 3.
13 Id.
14 Gurnek Bains, Explanations and the Need for Control, in ATrRIBUTION THEORY
126, 129 (Miles Hewstone ed., 1983).
15 C.E. Melton, Human Error in Aviation: Deliberate, Inadvertent or Reflecting Exper-
tise, in BUSINESS AVIATION SAFETY 13 (1991).
16 Id.
17 Hewstone, supra note 8, at 17.
18 J. Richard Eiser, From Attributions to Behaviour, in ATTRIBUTION THEORY 160,
165 (Miles Hewstone ed., 1983).
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perceived vulnerability to, and perceived severity of, a
particular illness, and his or her perception of efficacy,
costs and benefits involved in the recommended health
action."' 9 The Health Belief Model is a method of analyz-
ing a present situation, a future situation, and the costs
and benefits of the various paths between the two. For
instance, a patient with heart disease might face a choice
of undergoing a bypass operation, which encompasses the
risks of surgery and yet the prospects of a longer life. The
patient also has the option of doing nothing. Likewise,
actions that a person may take to reach a desired self-im-
pression have different costs and benefits, though the goal
of better self-impression remains the same.
The Health Belief Model has an analogy in general avia-
tion. A clear goal in aviation is safety because safe aerial
operations are useful, predictable and routine. Hence,
most pilots take personal pride in being safe. All pilots
are aware that an error can cause a serious accident. If an
accident leads -to litigation, the opportunity arises to
judge a pilot's degree of safety. If pilots perceive such
judgments as irrational, then there is no motivation to im-
prove self-esteem; the severity of the problem is high, vul-
nerability is insurmountable, and the costs are infinite. If
pilot negligence law, however, is closely tuned to aviation,
then the Health Belief Model predicts that safety
problems are treatable. A realistic and understandable
safety standard is attainable because vulnerability costs
are finite. Therefore, pilots are inclined to enhance safety
if there is a rational aviation liability system with which
they can comply.
The third attributional function is that of self-presenta-
tion. Under this function, an individual attributes respon-
sibility for results of an event in terms of social
responsibility rather than objective causation.2 0 Natu-
19 Jennifer King, Attribution Theory and the Health Belief Model, in ATrRIBUTION
THEORY 170, 171 (Miles Hewstone ed., 1983).
20 Hewstone, supra note 8, at 17; Sally Lloyd-Bostock, Attributions of Cause and
Responsibility as Social Phenomena, in ATrRIBUTION THEORY AND RESEARCH: CONCEP-
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rally, social and moral attitudes, which are independent of
the physical world, influence how an individual attributes
responsibility. 2' For example, as children develop, they
gradually assimilate the rules established by the commu-
nity. Those rules, like the laws of physics, become con-
straints on behavior.22 Thus, attributions inherently
include moral responsibility and blame.
Self-presentation is not wholly individualized and sub-
jective, however, because with moral blame comes societal
punishment. The individual in a community with certain
social and moral standards observes that "acts are not
evaluated in accordance with motive or intention, but in
terms of their objective consequences and their conform-
ity with established rules."2 4 Next, the individual ob-
serves that punishment follows the act and consequently
attributes the punishment to the wrong." Ultimately, an
individual objectively evaluates the magnitude of the
wrong by measuring the severity of the punishment. 6
Legal rules and punishments also influence how an indi-
vidual interprets the social world.2 7 Thus, legal rules pro-
vide an objective conception of the social responsibility of
members of a community.
The self-presentation function has direct application to
pilot negligence law. For the most part, pilots are very
safety conscious, both in their approach to primary train-
ing and continuing education. Moreover, the aviation
community possesses vast practical knowledge that has
TUAL, DEVELOPMENTAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS 261, 268 (Jos Jaspers et al. eds.,
1983).
21 Frank D. Fincham, Developmental Dimensions of Attribution Theory, in ATrRIBU-
TION THEORY AND RESEARCH: CONCEPTUAL, DEVELOPMENTAL AND SOCIAL DIMEN-
SIONS 117, 149 (Jos Jaspers et al. eds., 1983).
22 Id.
23 Mansur Lalijee & Robert P. Abelson, The Organization of Explanations, in ATrTR-
BUTION THEORY 65, 65 (Miles Hewstone ed., 1983).
24 Fincham, supra note 21, at 149.
25 Serge Moscovici & Miles Hewstone, Social Representations and Social Explana-
tions: From the 'Naive' to the 'Amateur' Scientist, in ATritBrioN THEORY 98, 123-24
(Miles Hewstone ed., 1983).
26 Fincham, supra note 21, at 149.
27 Lloyd-Bostock, supra note 20, at 289.
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led to generally accepted rules and practices. Necessarily,
pilot negligence law is also a part of those rules. Yet if
aviation law is closely related to aviation rules gleaned
from experience, and if such tort rules are known to pi-
lots, then pilots easily integrate them into the larger array
of rules and practices. Hence, because the pilot commu-
nity encourages safety, a body of aviation negligence law
that parallels these concerns reinforces and enhances
safety.
In summary, attribution theory suggests that a system
of pilot negligence law that reflects the factors that con-
tribute to aircraft accidents, as opposed to a system that
merely applies general negligence principles, better de-
ters unsafe conduct and results in increased flight safety.
First, negligence law that fairly judges pilot conduct moti-
vates pilots to take more control of the safety of their fly-
ing. Pilots have a high locus of control; improved
negligence law enhances that control by giving pilots the
assurance that they are judged from a position of aviation
knowledge. Second, improved pilot negligence law pro-
vides pilots with more accurate information, which pilots
use to act in their best interest and avoid legal liability.
Finally, improved pilot negligence law exerts more effec-
tive social pressure on pilots to act safely. "The only
practical and acceptable solution lies in enhanced educa-
tion and persuasion ... to imbue pilots with mature atti-
tudes toward flying."'28 Indeed, if negligence law is a last
resort to compensate a victim for the wrongful acts of an-
other, certainly avoiding accidents altogether is the pref-
erable result.
Therefore, investigation into the realities of general avi-
ation accidents is mandatory. The investigation must fo-
cus on the roles of pilots in aircraft accidents.
Consequently, liability of the manufacturer, owner, or op-
erator of an aircraft involved in an accident is not ger-
28 Melton, supra note 15, at 20.
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mane. Although non-pilot aviation liability involves
intriguing issues, it is not appropriate to this analysis.
III. APPLICATION OF THE HYPOTHESIS TO
PILOT NEGLIGENCE LAW
A. PILOT DISREGARD OF SAFETY PRACTICES: THE
FEDERAL AVIATION REGULATIONS AND
NEGLIGENCE PER SE
At the outset, many safety practices already exist in the
FARs, and a pilot's violation of an FAR should be negli-
gence per se. The doctrine of negligence per se is well es-
tablished, and courts apply it in aviation cases.
Significantly, the FARs are replete with rules directly re-
lated to general aviation safety. Hence, application of
negligence per se in general aviation is appropriate. Like
all doctrines, though, particular limits should define its
boundaries in the pilot negligence context. In this way
the doctrine is consistent with the control and self-presen-
tation functions of attribution theory.
The basic elements of negligence per se are straightfor-
ward. The doctrine applies to any statute enacted to en-
hance safety, that is, enacted to protect a particular group
of persons from a particular kind of harm. 29 By prescrib-
ing a special level of conduct, a safety statute defines the
duty of care in those instances in which the statute applies
and establishes a causal relationship between conduct and
harm. 30 In addition, the heightened duty under negli-
gence per se includes a requirement to take necessary pre-
cautions to prevent injury; one in control of a situation
must protect others who are unable to protect
themselves."
29 United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. National Ins. Underwriters, 344
N.W.2d 532, 534 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984).
so Gatenby v. Altoona Aviation Corp., 268 F. Supp. 599, 606 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
31 Florida Freight Terminals, Inc. v. Cabanas, 354 So. 2d 1222, 1225 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978).
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1. FAR Safety Regulations
Safety regulations pertaining to general aviation are lo-
cated in at least three parts of the FARs. The first is 14
C.F.R. Part 91, which governs the operation of aircraft op-
erated within the United States. 2 Part 91 includes many
major flight rules such as the use of alcohol or drugs by
pilots; required preflight action; right-of-way rules; visual
flight rules; instrument flight rules; equipment, instru-
ment, and certificate requirements; special flight opera-
tions; maintenance; large and turbine-powered
multiengine airplanes; equipment and operating require-
ments for large and transport category aircraft; foreign
aircraft operations and operations of U.S.-registered civil
aircraft outside of the United States; operating noise lim-
its; and waivers.33 Most of the rules in Part 91 relate di-
rectly to proper actions and conduct while in flight,
promoting the goal of ensuring flight safety.
Safety regulations are also located in Part 61, which
prescribes the requirements for pilot certificates and rat-
rngs, and the privileges and limitations incident to each. 4
Each pilot certificate or rating has specific minimum re-
quirements. For instance, Part 61 defines different types
of pilot certificates, including student pilot, recreational
pilot, private pilot, commercial pilot, airline transport pi-
lot, pilots qualified to operate multiengine aircraft (mul-
tiengine rating), and pilots qualified to fly solely by
reference to aircraft instruments (instrument rating).3 5
Most types of pilot certificates have different ratings for
particular aircraft categories, such as fixed wing, rotary
wing, glider, and free balloon, and some of the categories
are further divided into class ratings, such as single en-
gine and multiengine.36 For each certificate, category rat-
ing, and class rating that a pilot desires, the pilot must
14 C.F.R. § 91.1 (1992).
Id. pt. 91.
Id. § 61.1.
35 Id. pt. 61.
N Id.
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meet specific eligibility requirements and demonstrate a
minimum level of knowledge and proficiency.37 All of
these requirements are commensurate with the privileges
of the particular certificate or rating; greater authority and
responsibility come only with greater skill. Hence, every
requirement specified in Part 61 is designed to increase
the safety of flight.
Beyond initial certification requirements, Part 61 also
demands a prescribed level of recent flight experience.
First, a pilot may not act as pilot in command of an air-
craft carrying passengers unless the pilot has made three
takeoffs and three landings within the past ninety days in
an aircraft of the same category, class, and, if required,
type.38 In addition, if the pilot flies at night, the takeoffs
and landings must have been completed at night.39
Moreover, instrument flight rules cover the flight, the
pilot must have at least six hours of instrument flight time
in the preceding six months, including at least six instru-
ment approaches to airports or an instrument competency
check.40 Lastly, Part 61 requires a pilot to complete a
flight review within the preceding two years.4 ' It is the
responsibility of the individual pilot to meet all of the
foregoing requirements.42 Clearly, each step of the recent
experience criteria is aimed at ensuring proficiency in the
operation of aircraft and the avoidance of accidents.
Finally, Part 67 contains requirements for airman medi-
cal certificates. Most pilot certificates require the holder
to possess a valid medical certificate.43 Furthermore, no
person with a medical deficiency may act as a pilot.44
There are express requirements relating to general
37 See, e.g., id. §§ 61.123, 61.175, 61.127.
38 Id. § 61.57(c).
-9 Id. § 61.57(d).
40 Id. § 61.57(e).
41 Id. § 61.56(c).
42 See, e.g., id. § 91.103 (requiring the pilot to be familiar with all aspects of the
flight).
43 See, e.g., id. §§ 61.83(c), 61.103(c), 61.123(c), 61.151(e).
44 Id. § 61.53.
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health, vision, hearing acuity, mental and neurologic
health, cardiovascular health, and alcohol or drug depen-
dence for each type of medial certificate. 45 Again, these
requirements attempt to maximize flight safety.
2. FAR Negligence Per Se
Because the clear purpose of the FARs is to foster
safety, violation of most of the FARs should constitute
negligence per se. Courts hold that FARs are equivalent to
law.46 Moreover, some legal rules appropriately expand
the scope of FARs. There are, however, some prudent
limits that, if enforced by the courts, would aid the regula-
tions' intended purpose of enhancing safety and avoid
embroiling pilot defendants in legal battles over regula-
tory construction.
The primary reason to apply negligence per se is that
FARs hold a high status. The FARs have the force and
effect of law.47 FARs can be dispositive in a pilot negli-
gence case because a violation of an FAR amounts to a
breach of a legally imposed duty.48 Therefore, any FAR
that qualifies as a safety regulation provides a foundation
for negligence per se.
Thus, courts have found a variety of FARs to be safety
regulations and Parts 91 and 61 to be springboards for
negligence per se. For example, Part 91 regulations that
invoke the doctrine include section 91.103, which re-
quires a pilot to be familiar with all available information
concerning the flight; 49 section 91.155, which requires a
pilot operating under visual flight rules to maintain mini-
mum visibility and distances from clouds;50 and section
91.113, which requires a pilot to follow air traffic right-of-
way rules. 5' Also, others argue that failure to maintain in-
45 See e.g., id. §§ 67.13, 67.15, 67.17.
46 Wood v. United States, 14 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,821, 17,823 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
47 Id.
48 Florida v. Cabanas, 354 So. 2d 1222, 1225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
49 Id.
- Gatenby v. Altoona Aviation Corp., 268 F. Supp. 599, 606 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
5' United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. National Ins. Underwriters, 344
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strument qualifications under section 61.57(e) qualifies as
negligence per se.52 Hence, virtually any FAR that involves
the operation of aircraft, and not merely administrative
procedure, is a safety regulation under the doctrine.
Furthermore, two ancillary legal rules support the ap-
plication of negligence per se in the interest of safety. The
first is the presumption that a pilot knows, and will com-
ply with, the FARs. For example, an air traffic controller
has a right to assume that pilots are aware of, and will
abide by, all applicable FARs.53 This implies that pilots
know their airborne duties. Such a presumption furthers
safety interests because the controller has a separate job
to perform, and policing presumably qualified pilots
should not be a part of that job. In addition, if everyone,
pilots and controllers, knows and follows the FARs, then
there is predictability in the actions of all. Therefore,
the presumption of knowledge and compliance is
appropriate.
The second rule helps to sort out the obligations of pi-
lots and air traffic controllers. The Wood v. United States
decision may stand for the proposition that when an issue
of whether the pilot or the controller violated a regulation
exists, then the responsibility for unfortunate conse-
quences lies with the pilot.54 In that case, the controller
issued takeoff clearance to a pilot for a flight under visual
flight rules. Thereafter, the pilot had a duty to keep the
aircraft in visual meteorological flight conditions, i.e. out
of the clouds.5 5 In so holding, the court relied on section
91.3(a),56 which states that "[t]he pilot in command of an
aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final author-
N.W.2d 532, 534-35 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984). When this case was decided, 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.113 was codified at 14 C.F.R. § 91.67.
52 Norwest Capital Management & Trust Co. v. United States, 828 F.2d 1330,
1347 (8th Cir. 1987) (dissenting opinion).
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ity as to, the operation of that aircraft."' 57 This rule is ap-
propriate because, as between pilot and controller, the
pilot is the one actually in the aircraft and consequently is
in the best position to judge the correct course of action
with respect to that aircraft. Therefore, the burden of
avoiding a regulatory violation rests with the pilot.
3. Limits on Pilot Negligence Per Se
At the same time, pilot negligence per se should be pru-
dently limited to avoid unfairness and unnecessary confu-
sion. Specifically, plaintiffs in negligence per se cases must
prove all the elements of negligence; a statute defines the
duty, but the plaintiff must also show causation and dam-
ages. 58 Also, courts must strictly construe the FARs be-
cause they contain several examples of potentially
conflicting regulations.5 9
The act of a FAR violation must meet the elements of a
negligence cause of action. As with other allegedly negli-
gent acts, the FAR violation must proximately cause in-
jury.60 Further, proximate causation is generally a
question for the jury.6' Thus, pilot negligence per se is
part of an element of a negligence claim, not a shorter
path to liability.
Moreover, negligence per se should only apply when the
specific FAR sufficiently puts a pilot on notice of what
constitutes a violation. Because of the potential misinter-
pretation by the ultimate users of an FAR, courts should
not extend the FAR beyond the plain meaning of its
terms.62 Although the FARs presumably guide pilots and
57 14 C.F.R. § 91.3(a) (1992).
58 Annau v. Schutte, 535 P.2d 1095, 1098 (Idaho 1975).
59 See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 61.56(c) (flight reviews); id. § 61.51(c)(2) (logging flight
time); id. § 61.97(a) (awareness of AIM); id. § 61.105(a) (awareness of AIM)
(1992).
- Annau, 535 P.2d at 1098.
61 Id.
62 Upper Valley Aviation, Inc. v. Fryer, 392 S.W.2d 737, 741-42 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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others in aviation, confusing and conflicting regulations
exist.
There are at least three examples of such confusing reg-
ulations. The first example is the requirement for annual
flight reviews. Presently, each pilot must complete a flight
review within the preceding twenty-four calendar
months. 6
[A]fter August 31, 1993 [though], each recreational pilot
who has logged fewer than 400 hours of flight time as a
pilot and each non-instrument-rated private pilot, other
than a glider-rated private pilot, who has logged fewer
than 400 hours of flight time as a pilot must have [com-
pleted a flight review] since the beginning of the 12th cal-
endar month before the month in which that pilot acts as
pilot-in-command of an aircraft. 64
This regulation, however, does not resolve the situation
of a pilot who holds a commercial pilot certificate for one
category of aircraft and a private pilot certificate for an-
other category. This regulation obviously compels pilots
to obtain periodic outside reviews of their flying skills to
maintain flight safety, yet, upon reading the regulation,
one has no idea what to do in some situations.
The second example concerns the recording of flight
time as pilot in command. Conceptually, every manned
air vehicle has a pilot in command. Section 91.3 supports
this concept by placing authority and responsibility with
the pilot in command. 65 Section 61.51(c)(2), however,
states that only recreational, private, and commercial pi-
lots may log time as pilot in command in their logbooks.6 6
The section implicitly excludes student pilots. 67 The reg-
ulations, however, permit a student pilot to fly as the sole
occupant of an aircraft. 68 Thus, if a student pilot is the
6s 14 C.F.R. § 61.56(c) (1992).
- Id. § 61.56(d).
65 Id. § 91.3.
Id. § 61.51(c)(2).
67 Id. § 61.51(c).
- Id. §§ 61.87, 61.89.
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sole occupant of an aircraft, then that flight will never be
recorded anywhere as having a pilot in command.
Required awareness of the AIM is the third example.
Applicants for recreational or private pilot certificates
must have knowledge of the use of the AIM.69 Curiously,
the FARs list no such requirement for applicants of com-
mercial or airline transport certificates. Furthermore, the
private pilot requirement literally applies only to airplane
and rotorcraft certificates, not glider, airship, or free bal-
loon certificates. 70 The AIM is an important document
because it describes the rules and procedures for Ameri-
can aviation. 71 Given this fact, surely the FARs do not
mean to imply that the individuals in airline cockpits need
not know anything about the airspace system in which
they fly. Hence, some FARs are ambiguous.
The foregoing examples show that a pilot who is ear-
nestly attempting to comply with the FARs may confront
confusion. Complying with recent experience require-
ments, recording flight time, or even becoming a pilot can
present problems. In the context of judging a pilot's ac-
tions, it is unfair to hold a pilot liable for not understand-
ing an incomprehensible rule. Therefore, courts should
strictly construe FARs to limit negligence per se.
In addition to strict construction, courts must alleviate
the rigidity of negligence per se in emergency situations.
In the first instance, the FARs permit violations. In an in-
flight emergency, the pilot may deviate from any rule of
Part 91 to the extent required to meet the emergency.72
Accordingly, in an emergency situation, a violation of a
FAR should only be evidence of negligence.73 Moreover,
the "sudden emergency" doctrine from ordinary negli-
gence law should apply in aviation cases because the ex-
ternal forces in a situation may bear on the question of
- Id. §§ 61.97(a), 61.105(a).
70 Id. § 61.105.
7' FAA, AIRMAN'S INFORMATION MANUAL 1 (1992).
712 14 C.F.R. § 91.3(b) (1992); Bolick v. Sunbird Airlines, Inc., 386 S.E.2d 76, 78
(N.C. Ct. App. 1989), aft'd, 396 S.E.2d 323 (N.C. 1990).
71 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 671 F.2d 810, 817 (4th Cir. 1982).
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whether the pilot breached a duty of care.74 Thus, in an
emergency the pilot would only be required to exercise
due care under the circumstances. That is, when "one
who through no fault of his own, is confronted with a sud-
den peril and does things which afterward may seem to
have been improper or foolish is not negligent if he does
what a prudent man would or might do under the circum-
stances. 75 In all, the FAR violation must flow not from
the circumstances of the situation but from an unwar-
ranted disregard of the FARs.
In summary, negligence per se should apply to pilot neg-
ligence because the FARs' primary role is safety, and neg-
ligence per se is useful in motivating pilots via the control
and self-presentation functions of attribution theory. In
its basic application, a legal rule requiring compliance
with the FARs ensures behavior that the FAA deems safe.
Of course, negligence per se must have certain limits to be
equitable, such as strict construction and the "sudden
emergency" doctrine. If designed in this way, negligence
per se will motivate pilots to control their acts, as well as
any potential liability, by merely knowing and following
the rules. If the FARs are clear and understandable, then
so are the safe practices contained therein. Also, compli-
ance with the rules of general aviation is the societal norm
in general aviation. Pilots are indoctrinated toward safety,
and thus pilots feel a social responsibility to conform to
the aviation community, including compliance with the
FARs. Hence, the pilot negligence per se doctrine benefits
all in the form of safer aviation.
B. PILOT DISREGARD OF THE AIRMAN'S INFORMATION
MANUAL AND OTHER FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION SAFETY LITERATURE
The FARs are not the only source of guidance in gen-
eral aviation. The AIM and advisory circulars, also pub-
74 Bolick, 386 S.E.2d at 79.
75 Chapman v. United States, 194 F.2d 974, 978 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
821 (1972).
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lished by the FAA, provide rules for air safety, and
violation of them should be either evidence of pilot negli-
gence or negligence per se. These documents are sources
of nonregulatory information regarding aviation in the
United States.76 As such, they are directly relevant to the
standard of care as it relates to pilots. Indeed, the AIM
and advisory circulars provide the same motivations for
pilot control of conduct as well as pilot conformity with
the societal norms of aviation.
The AIM is the major documentary source about flying,
as it contains the fundamental information required to fly
in the United States." In addition, the AIM describes
how the FARs apply to various situations. 7 The chapters
of the AIM include detailed descriptions of, navigation
aids, airport visual aids, airspace, air traffic control, emer-
gency procedures, safety of flight issues, aviation physiol-
ogy, and aeronautical publications.79  Thus, the AIM
provides a comprehensive source of information for
pilots.
Advisory circulars supplement the material presented in
the AIM. Advisory circulars inform the aviation public of
nonregulatory materials of interest.80 The FAA issues ad-
visory circulars with a numbering system that corresponds
to the subject areas of the FARs.81 Examples of advisory
circulars include the Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowl-
edge (AC 61-23B),8 2 Aviation Weather For Pilots and Flight Op-
erations Personnel (EA-AC 00-6A) ,83 Aviation Weather Services
(AC 00-45C), 4 and the Aviation Instructor's Handbook (AC
60-14).5 In short, the advisory circular system is the
76 FAA, supra note 71, at 1.
77 Id.
78 In re N-500L Cases, 691 F.2d 15, 28 (1st Cir. 1982).
79 FAA, supra note 71, at 7-14.
80 Id. at 2.
sa Id.
82 FAA, PILOT'S HANDBOOK OF AERONAUTICAL KNOWLEDGE (1980).
83 FAA, AVIATION WEATHER FOR PILOTS AND FLIGHT OPERATIONS PERSONNEL
(1975).
FAA, AVIATION WEATHER SERVICES (1985).
s FAA, AVIATION INSTRUCTOR'S HANDBOOK (1977).
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FAA's set of pilot safety literature.
Considering the wealth and importance of the safety in-
formation contained in the AIM and advisory circulars, vi-
olation of their precepts should be at the least evidence of
negligence. The AIM and advisory circulars are evidence
of customary flying practices and are thus evidence of the
standard of care.86 Because flying is a very specialized ac-
tivity, courts must look to extra-legal references such as
the AIM and advisory circulars to ascertain whether a par-
ticular pilot acted negligently. The AIM and advisory cir-
culars are the natural choice because, aside from the
FARs, they constitute the most authoritative source of ma-
terial on aviation safety. Hence, the information con-
tained in the AIM and advisory circulars should be a
foundation for determining pilot negligence.
Beyond just evidence, the violation of a principle in the
AIM or an advisory circular should be negligence per se.
First, if a court has no sources other than the AIM or advi-
sory circulars to determine the appropriate standard of
care, then the court has no independent legal basis for
establishing the standard of care and will no doubt follow
the FAA's documented standards without question. Fur-
ther, there is authority for the proposition that pilots are
obliged to follow the strictures of the AIM. 87 Also, in re-
quiring that applicants for private pilot certificates be fa-
miliar with the AIM and advisory circulars, the FARs
require those pilots to know and follow them.8 8 As de-
scribed above, this provision of the FARs strictly applies
only to private pilot airplane and rotorcraft certificates.
This restriction is illogical. Therefore, the AIM and advi-
sory circulars partly define the standard of care in pilot
negligence cases, and violation of either should be negli-
gence per se.
Logically, the limitations of the negligence per se doc-
8- Mallen v. United States, 506 F. Supp. 728, 735 (N.D. Ga. 1979); accord In re N-
500L Cases, 691 F.2d 15, 28 (1st Cir. 1982).
81 Barbosa v. United States, 811 F.2d 1444, 1446 (11th Cir. 1987).
Rodriguez v. United States, 823 F.2d 735, 739 (3d Cir. 1987).
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trine with respect to FAR violations should also apply to
violations of the AIM and advisory circulars. First, the
rule allegedly violated must be one intended to protect
particular persons from particular harm. Next, the viola-
tion must be the proximate cause of the injury. Also,
strict construction is required to avoid innocent misinter-
pretation as a basis for liability. Lastly, courts should re-
lax negligence per se in emergency situations.
Exactly as in the FARs, pilots can internalize the prac-
tice of following the AIM and advisory circulars to en-
hance control and self-presentation. It is an easy task to
apply widely available documentary information into eve-
ryday flying practices. In addition, the motivation toward
greater control already exists in pilots. Therefore, pilots
can easily satisfy their desires for control by following the
published rules. Additionally, safe practices inherent in
the AIM and advisory circulars reinforce the safety-ori-
ented norm of the aviation community. For pilots, con-
forming to the documents is tantamount to conforming to
the societal norm, and therefore compliance with them
permits pilots to hold themselves out as safe. Hence, pi-
lot negligence per se should also encompass the AIM and
advisory circulars.
C. PILOT DISREGARD OF ORDINARY CARE IN GENERAL:
WHAT SHOULD THE STANDARD OF CARE BE?
A pilot, like anyone else, is capable of acting negli-
gently. Negligence law imposes a duty of ordinary care
upon all persons, and measures alleged negligence
against this standard. One must consider, however, the
specialized circumstances surrounding an aircraft accident
along with the general duty to use ordinary care. Accord-
ingly, useful and rational bases for defining pilots' duty of
care are necessary. Such bases exist in the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) aircraft accident
data collected since 1969 and take the form of data on
total pilot experience, experience in the type of aircraft
involved in the accident, and pilot certification. By apply-
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ing the lessons learned from aircraft accidents to shape
measurements of pilot conduct, legal liability closely
matches pilots' operational experiences. In turn, pilots
have a clear, realistic, and attainable standard of care they
can internalize.
Unfortunately, tort law prefers a simple, global, objec-
tive standard for measuring the reasonableness of pilot
conduct, instead of a standard that is as specialized as the
activity. The duty is one of ordinary care under the cir-
cumstances.8 9 Some justification exists for this standard,
such as that suggested by Prosser and Keeton:
The whole theory of negligence presupposes some uni-
form standard of behavior. Yet the infinite variety of situ-
ations which may arise makes it impossible to fix definite
rules in advance for all conceivable human conduct. The
utmost that can be done is to devise something in the na-
ture of a formula, the application of which in each particu-
lar case must be left to the jury, or to the court. The
standard of conduct which the community demands must
be an external and objective one, rather than the individ-
ual judgment, good or bad, of the particular actor; and it
must be, so far as possible, the same for all persons, since
the law can have no favorites. At the same time, it must
make proper allowance for the risk apparent to the actor,
for his capacity to meet it, and for the circumstances under
which he must act.90
In addition, there seems to be a major fear that any elabo-
ration on the basic negligence standard somehow invali-
dates the ordinary rules of negligence. 91
Jury instructions, however, never seem to be as simple
as "ordinary care under the circumstances." Consider,
for example:
Negligence is the doing of some act which a reasonably
prudent person would not do, or the failure to do some-
89 Galindo v. TMT Transport, Inc., 733 P.2d 631, 632 (Ariz. 1986); DiCenzo v.
Izawa, 723 P.2d 171, 179 (Haw. 1986).
- Galindo, 733 P.2d at 632-33 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 32, at 173 (5th ed. 1984)).
91 DiCenzo, 723 P.2d at 180.
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thing which a reasonably prudent person would do, under
the circumstances shown by the evidence. It is the failure
to use ordinary care.
Ordinary care is that care which persons of ordinary
prudence would, under the circumstances shown by the
evidence, exercise in the management of their own affairs
in order to avoid injury or damage to themselves or their
property, or to the persons or property of others.
Ordinary care is not an absolute term, but a relative
one. That is to say, in deciding whether ordinary care was
exercised in a given case, the conduct in question must be
considered in the light of all the surrounding circum-
stances, as shown by the evidence. 2
The simple, objective standard seems to be cast off. Pros-
ser and Keeton make allowances for apparent risk, capac-
ity of the actor, and circumstances. Likewise, the jury
instruction above mentions the "surrounding circum-
stances" three times. Consequently, although courts and
commentators profess an all-encompassing negligence
standard, the standard tends to be situation-specific.
The current standard of care in pilot negligence cases is
the same regarding care and circumstances. Pilots have a
duty to exercise ordinary care, based on common law
principles of negligence.9" Still, ordinary care in pilot
negligence cases depends on the surrounding circum-
stances. Again, circumstances creep into the analysis and
make each case unique.
By acknowledging the existence of circumstances,
courts must ultimately address the circumstance of pilot
experience. A court may refuse to inject pilot experience
into the standard of care, but still must regard it as a cir-
cumstance. T-Craft Aero Club, Inc. v. Blough94 provides an
example:
92 Id. at 178 (quoting RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965)).
93 Hayes v. United States, 899 F.2d 438, 443 (5th Cir. 1990); Mackey v. Miller,
273 S.E.2d 550, 552 (Va. 1981); Todd v. Weikle, 376 A.2d 104, 109 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1977); Rennekamp v. Blair, 101 A.2d 669, 670 (Pa. 1954) (applying
West Virginia law).
9 642 P.2d 70 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982).
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Blough next challenges the standard of care applied by the
trial court. She contends that the court used the standard
of an experienced pilot exercising ordinary care, rather
than the standard of a student pilot exercising ordinary
care. The argument suggests that there are separate stan-
dards for experienced pilots and student pilots. This
premise is incorrect. There is only one standard-ordi-
nary care. The degree of experience is a factor to be con-
sidered, along with other circumstances, in applying the
standard. 95
Thus, the Blough court rejected a different standard of
care, but nonetheless considered pilot experience to be a
factor.
Conversely, the court in Surface v. Johnson9 6 implicitly
adopted a variable standard of care in a pilot negligence
case. Fred Johnson, defendant's decedent, was a student
pilot who died in the crash of his airplane. The court said
that:
it is clear that Johnson was negligent in even undertaking
the flight in question. In so doing, Johnson was not only
guilty of simple negligence, but ... of culpable and wan-
ton negligence in undertaking a night flight far beyond the
level of his experience and training over mountainous ter-
rain in extremely bad weather. He knowingly undertook
the same flight that Perdue [Johnson's flight instructor], a
far more qualified and experienced pilot, had declined to
take in Johnson's plane because of existing conditions.9 7
Here, the court assigned a higher degree of negligence to
Johnson only by virtue of his lack of experience. Yet, the
question remains whether Perdue, an experienced pilot,
would have been negligent or wantonly negligent in at-
tempting the same flight. Because the court did not say
that anyone who attempted this flight would have been
wantonly negligent, the answer apparently is that a pilot
like Perdue would have been simply negligent. There-
95 Id. at 72.
9 214 S.E.2d 152 (Va. 1975).
97 Id. at 154-55.
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fore, the Surface court implied that it would recognize a
variable standard of care in pilot negligence cases.
The court in Heath v. Swift Wings, Inc. 98 seemed to com-
bine the two foregoing formulae. First, the court held
that "[t]he trial court improperly introduced a subjective
standard of care into the definition of negligence by refer-
ring to the 'ordinary care, and caution, which an ordinary
prudent pilot having the same training and experience as Fred
Heath, would have used in the same or similar circum-
stances.'-99 Then, the court acknowledged
that one who engages in a business, occupation, or profes-
sion must exercise the requisite degree of learning, skill,
and ability of that calling with reasonable and ordinary
care, [and, f]urthermore, the specialist within a profession
may be held to a standard of care greater than that re-
quired of the general practitioner. 00
This rule presents three different reasonably prudent per-
sons: the ordinary person, the professional, and the pro-
fessional specialist. While the Heath court settled for the
ordinary person, the ordinary person standard does not
address reality because the ordinary person knows little
about flying, just as the ordinary person knows little about
law or medicine. The best pigeonhole for pilots might be
the second tier, that of one in a skilled calling, although
many pilots do not receive compensation for flying. A
pilot, such as a flight instructor, may even fit into the spe-
cialist class. However, to not address the pilot experience
issue at all is to ignore the phrase "under the
circumstances."
Ultimately, the Heath court leaves us in suspense. "The
plaintiff is entitled to an instruction holding Fred Heath to
the objective minimum standard of care applicable to all
pilots." ° 1 The contours of the objective minimum stan-
dard are left to the imagination of the reader. Accepting
98 252 S.E.2d 526 (N.C. App. Ct. 1979).
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the challenge, the following is an imaginative attempt to
define those minima.
An appropriate minimum standard for judging pilots as
trained specialists must flow from a rational examination
of the widely diverse population of those pilots. Certainly
pilots must conform to a higher standard of care commen-
surate with their expertise in aviation. After all, negli-
gence law dictates that lawyers, as legal specialists, must
exercise the same skill, prudence, and diligence as ordi-
nary lawyers, not ordinary persons.10 2 Although this stan-
dard of care for pilots must be higher than simple
ordinary care, it must be practical when applied to pilots
with a few hours' experience as well as to pilots with
thousands of hours logged. With this in mind, objectivity
compels a study of pilots' propensity for aircraft accidents
with respect to total flying experience, total experience in
the particular type of aircraft involved in the accident, and
level of pilot certification. The result will be an "objective
minimum standard of care applicable to all pilots."'0 3
The first study compares accidents with total flight time
of the pilots in command of the accident aircraft. The fol-
lowing tables summarize the total number of accidents in
each range of total flight time, corrected to reflect the var-
ious sizes of the experience intervals.10 4
Pilot Experience, Corrected Total,







Pilot experience unknown in 3.1% of accidents.
102 Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 491 P.2d 421, 422-23
(Cal. 1971) (en banc).
10- Heath, 252 S.E.2d at 529.
104 See infra Appendix A for an explanation of data analysis.
105 ANNUAL REVIEW OF AIRCRAFr ACCIDENT DATA, U.S. GENERAL AVIATION,
CALENDAR YEAR 1988 30 (1991) [hereinafter ARAAD, followed by the year];
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Pilot Experience, Corrected Total,







Pilot experience unknown in 6.6% of accidents.
The data show two significant trends. First, accidents
drop sharply after 100 hours of total experience. Second,
at each succeeding interval after 100 hours, decreases in
corrected accidents are successively greater. The 100-500
hour accident figures decline from the 50-100 hour
figures by 53.5% and 44.0% for total and fatal accidents,
respectively. Likewise, the percent changes from 100-500
hours to 500-1000 hours are 62.9% for total accidents
and 63.0% for fatal accidents. The percent reductions
progressively increase with higher levels of pilot
experience.
Although all of the decreases in accidents are large, the
objective minimum standard should be set at 500 hours.
The progressively larger accident decreases would justify
placing the standard at any point over 100 hours, even
10,000 hours. Standards higher than 500 hours, however,
would be unrealistic because few pilots possess that much
experience. 0 7 In practice, therefore, a very high standard
ARAAD 1987 29 (1989); ARAAD 1986 29 (1988); ARAAD 1985 29 (1987);
ARAAD 1984 29 (1987); ARAAD 1983 28 (1987); ARAAD 1982 28 (1986);
ARAAD 1981 27 (1984); ARAAD 1980 25 (1984); ARAAD 1979 99 (1981);
ARAAD 1978 97 (1980); ARAAD 1977 100 (1978); ARAAD 1976 89 (1978);
ARAAD 1975 86 (1977); ARAAD 1974 87 (1976); ARAAD 1973 91 (1975);
ARAAD 1972 91 (1974); ARAAD 1970 15 (1974); ARAAD 1969 14 (1971).
I06 ARAAD 1979 99 (1981); ARAAD 1978 97 (1980); ARAAD 1977 100 (1978);
ARAAD 1976 87 (1978); ARAAD 1975 86 (1977); ARAAD 1974 87 (1976);
ARAAD 1973 91 (1975); ARAAD 1972 91 (1974); ARAAD 1970 15 (1974);
ARAAD 1969 14 (1971).
107 See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1992 629 (112th ed. 1991) (stating that almost half of the pilot certifi-
cates held in the United States are student or private certificates).
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would require the training of student pilots to the level of
airline captain before permitting them to fly solo. On the
other hand, setting the standard very low, such as at 100
hours, is similarly unpalatable. A pilot with 100 hours ex-
perience is barely qualified to carry passengers. The
FARs require forty hours just to apply for an airplane pri-
vate pilot certificate. 0 8 Also, 100 hours may be only a few
months' flying experience.10 9 Lastly, setting a low stan-
dard would be admitting that flying is dangerous, and
consequently, high accident rates are inevitable. This
logic contravenes the hypothesis that all accidents are pre-
ventable, and that pilots can control how many accidents
they prevent. It also contradicts the FAA's opinion that
private pilots with less than 400 hours need annual, rather
than biennial, flight reviews to maintain proficiency."
Hence, according to statistics of total accidents versus pi-
lot experience, the minimum standard should be the ordi-
narily prudent pilot with 500 hours of flight time.
The next study compares the numbers of total and fatal
accidents to pilot experience in aircraft type, to see
whether more specialized experience reduces accidents.
The following tables summarize the NTSB data.
Corrected Total,







Pilot experience unknown in 5.2% of accidents.
loS 14 C.F.R. § 61.109 (1992).
109 See, e.g., the 30-day guaranteed instrument rating course offered by Ameri-
can Flyers, Addison, Texas. An instrument rating requires 40 hours of instrument
time. 14 C.F.R. § 61.65(e)(2) (1992).
1lo See 14 C.F.R. § 61.56 (1992).
'11 ARAAD 1979 99 (1981); ARAAD 1978 97 (1980); ARAAD 1977 100 (1978);
ARAAD 1976 89 (1978); ARAAD 1975 86 (1977); ARAAD 1974 91 (1976);
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Corrected Total,








Pilot experience unknown in 13.4% of accidents.
Corrected Total,







Pilot experience unknown in 26.3% of accidents.
The trends in the data are similar to those relating acci-
dents to total experience. At each interval of greater ex-
perience in aircraft type, the number of accidents
significantly declines, and the reductions grow toward the
bottom of each table. Percent reductions in accidents
from 0-50 hours to 50-100 hours vary between 56% and
62%, and subsequent reductions range from 73% to 92%
between each interval.
ARAAD 1973 87 (1975); ARAAD 1972 91 (1974); ARAAD 1970 15 (1974);
ARAAD 1969 14 (1971); see infra Appendix A for data analysis.
112 ARAAD 1988 30 (1991); ARAAD 1987 29 (1989); ARAAD 1986 29 (1988);
ARAAD 1985 29 (1987); ARAAD 1984 29 (1987); ARAAD 1983 28 (1987);
ARAAD 1982 28 (1986); see infra Appendix A for data analysis.
I's ARAAD 1979 99 (1981); ARAAD 1978 97 (1980); ARAAD 1977 100 (1980);
ARAAD 1976 87 (1978); ARAAD 1975 86 (1977); ARAAD 1974 87 (1976);
ARAAD 1973 91 (1975); ARAAD 1972 91 (1974); ARAAD 1970 15 (1974);
ARAAD 1969 14 (1971); see infra Appendix A for data analysis.
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The data indicate that the minimum standard of care
should be set at 100 hours of time in type. Pilots at the
high end of the 50-100 hour group are involved in far
fewer than half the number of accidents as pilots with less
than fifty hours in type. Next, pilots with 100 hours in
type are also at the lower end of the 100-500 hour group,
which has more than three-quarters less propensity to-
ward accidents than the 50-100 hour group. Also, the as-
signment of 100 hours is probably realistic in terms of the
flight experience of any particular pilot. Hypothetically,
for instance, the ordinary 500 hour pilot would have expe-
rience spread over five types of aircraft. Hence, the objec-
tive minimum standard should be the ordinarily prudent
pilot with 100 hours of experience in the type of aircraft
involved in the accident.
The final study relates accidents to the pilot certificate
held by the pilot in command of the accident aircraft.
Holding a pilot certificate signifies two things. First, it
shows that the pilot has at least a certain amount of total
experience. In powered airplanes, for instance, a private
pilot has at least forty hours," 4 a commercial pilot has at
least 250 hours," 5 and an airline transport pilot has at
least 1500 hours." 6 A certificate also denotes that the
holder demonstrated the requisite levels of knowledge
and proficiency during the pilot's FAA flight test.'" The
table below shows how this circumstance compares with
aircraft accidents.
114 14 C.F.R. § 61.113(a) (1992).
115 Id. § 61.129(b).
116 Id. § 61.155(b)(2).
"7 See, e.g., id. §§ 61.013(e), 61.123(3), 61.167(a).
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Percent of Fatal or












The data show that the minimum standard should be
the ordinary private pilot. Most of the accidents in the
period involved either a private or a commercial pilot.
The distribution between the two is roughly equal; the
Commercial and Commercial with Instructor Rating cate-
gories total 38.9%, which is comparable to 44.6% for the
Private category. Hence, there is no need to consider us-
ing commercial pilot skills in the minimum pilot standard
because there are nearly as many accidents with commer-
cial pilots as with private pilots. Moreover, although air-
line transport pilots have far fewer accidents, they
probably comprise a very small fraction of the pilot popu-
lation. Likewise, a student pilot standard is not proper
because student pilots are not even qualified to carry pas-
sengers. 119 Thus, the objective minimum standard should
be the ordinarily prudent private pilot.
In conclusion, analysis of NTSB general aviation acci-
dent data indicates that the objective minimum standard
to apply in pilot negligence cases should be the degree of
118 ARAAD 1979 102 (1981); ARAAD 1978 100 (1980); ARAAD 1977 103
(1978); ARAAD 1976 92 (1978); ARAAD 1975 89 (1977); ARAAD 1974 90
(1976); ARAAD 1973 94 (1975); ARAAD 1974 94 (1976); see infra Appendix A for
data analysis.
119 14 C.F.R. § 61.89(a)(1) (1992).
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care exercised by an ordinarily prudent private pilot with
500 hours of total flight experience and 100 hours experi-
ence in the accident aircraft type. Pilots with 500 hours
total and 100 in type are substantially less likely to be in-
volved in aviation accidents than less experienced pilots.
Also, while actual experience bears directly upon accident
propensity, the additional flying skill of commercial pilots
over private pilots does not. Further, this standard sup-
ports the control function of attribution theory. The stan-
dard is within the comprehension, and likely within the
grasp, of most pilots.
Thus, if a particular pilot possesses less experience,
then that pilot will be on notice that he or she must
sharpen his or her airmanship skills to the legally accepta-
ble level. Likewise, a pilot with superior experience will
know that the skills to be especially safe in the air are pres-
ent, and the capacity to exceed the threshold of legal neg-
ligence exists. Of course, expert testimony would educate
jurors on the skills and knowledge of the standard pilot.
Therefore, the law should base general aviation pilot neg-
ligence determinations on this standard.
D. LIABILITY FOR PILOT MISTAKES AND POOR JUDGMENT
Pilot negligence law must also account for the remain-
ing accidents that result from pilot error in the form of
mistakes and poor judgment. Imposing liability for mis-
takes and poor judgment does not fit within the tort law
policy of deterring culpable conduct. Mistakes infer ac-
tions that result in unintended, unforeseeable results,
rather than actions without regard for others' safety. De-
spite that, to forego consideration of accidents caused by
mistakes and poor judgment is to ignore the hypothesis
that human fault is always present in aircraft accidents.
The question, then, is what are the other human agencies
that contribute to pilot error. There are three pilot-candi-
dates. The first is the flight instructor who provided the
initial flight training to the pilot of the accident aircraft.
The second is the check airman who issued the accident
1993] 1121
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pilot's certificate. The third is the flight instructor who
conducted the accident pilot's most recent recurrent
training.
The pilot's primary flight instructor may have potential
liability because the skills that the pilot learned initially
are vital to the pilot's exercise of safe practices. Many as-
pects of flying have no counterparts in everyday activities,
so the beginning student's knowledge base is small. To
become an airplane private pilot, for example, a person
must complete a course of instruction on such topics as
navigation, weather, aeronautical weather reports and
forecasts, high-density airport operations, collision avoid-
ance procedures, radio communications, and aerodynam-
ics. ' 2  Above all, though, a student pilot learns the
fundamental skill of proper judgment.
In aviation, judgment is the ability to make sound deci-
sions both on the ground and in the air. It is the most
important single attribute of a safe pilot .... A responsi-
ble attitude, adequate knowledge, and the skills developed
through experience are the ingredients required for good
decision making.' 2 1
Accordingly, most of aviation is unfamiliar to the new stu-
dent. Thus, proper initial training is necessary to flight
safety.
However, holding a pilot's primary flight instructor lia-
ble for the pilot's mistakes or poor judgment is not a suit-
able rule. The pilot's initial instruction may be years or
decades distant, requiring a stretch of the causation chain.
Next, the pilot in command rule of section 91.3 clearly
dictates that any pilot not aboard the aircraft does not
have ultimate responsibility for that aircraft. 2 2 Lastly, a
rule imposing liability on a flight instructor for another's
lapse of judgment does not reconcile with the control
function of attribution theory because the flight instructor
is not present to exert any control over the accident air-
120 14 C.F.R. § 61.105(a) (1992).
12 FAA, MANUAL OF FLIGHT 11-15 (1985).
122 14 C.F.R. § 91.3 (1992).
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craft or pilot. Hence, pilot negligence law should not as-
sess liability against a primary flight instructor for the
mistakes or poor judgment of the instructor's former
student.
The second candidate is the pilot's check airman. A
prerequisite of any pilot certificate or rating, except stu-
dent pilot, is the successful completion of an oral and
flight test. 23 The test, given by an FAA inspector or ex-
aminer, focuses on procedures and maneuvers required
by the flight proficiency provisions pertaining to that cer-
tificate. 24 As the FARs specify, either FAA inspectors,
who are FAA employees, or designated examiners, who
are qualified members of the pilot community, may con-
duct flight tests. 2 5 These individuals are known collec-
tively as check airmen. Thus, when a check airman
evaluates a pilot applicant, the check airman essentially
certifies that, at the moment in time of the test, the appli-
cant possesses skills at the levels required for the certifi-
cate or rating sought.
Clearly, check airmen are analogous to primary flight
instructors with respect to liability if the pilot applicant is
later involved in an aircraft accident. Like flight instruc-
tors, check airmen could be temporally distant. Also, the
pilot in command rule does not change with the addition
of greater privileges to the accident pilot's certificate. 26
Finally, check airmen have no means of control over po-
tential accidents, and are at the mercy of the future com-
petency of pilot applicants. Therefore, pilot negligence
law should not impose liability on a check airman for the
mistakes or poor judgment of a past flight test applicant.
Chronologically, the third candidate in the sequence of
evaluators of the pilot of the accident aircraft is the flight
instructor who conducted the pilot's most recent recur-
rent training. Each pilot must successfully complete a bi-
,23 Id. § 61.103(e); see also id. §§ 61.96(e), 61.167(a).
124 Id. § 61.103(e); see also id. §§ 61.96(e), 61.123(e), 61.167(a).
125 Id. § 61.103(e); see also id. §§ 61.96(e), 61.123(e), 61.167(a).
126 Id. § 91.3.
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ennial flight review to act as a pilot in command. 2 7 The
flight review consists of a review of the flight rules of Part
91 and a review of the flight maneuvers and procedures
that the administrator of the review feels are necessary to
ascertain the pilot's competency. 128 Although any person
designated by the FAA may conduct flight reviews, flight
instructors usually administer them. 12 9
A flight instructor could rightfully be liable for negli-
gently conducting a flight review. A biennial flight review
is a very minimal continuing training requirement. The
competency standard, that the pilot "demonstrate the safe
exercise of the privileges of the pilot certificate,"' 30 is
vague. Moreover, nowhere does the regulation state that
the pilot and flight instructor must actually fly together.
Without any specific requirements for flight reviews, a
flight instructor could possibly conduct a cursory review
and send off an obviously deficient pilot. In such a case, it
would be reasonable to hold the flight instructor liable for
contributing to an accident.
Despite the case of patent instructor neglect, though,
assessing liability for mistakes and poor judgment in inad-
equate recurrent training is unsuitable because evidence
has shown that mistakes are directly proportional to
expertise.
[T]he mental errors that lead to horrendous accidents are
indistinguishable in nature from the trivial, absentminded
slips and lapses of everyday life.
These findings underscore a crucial point about absent-
minded errors: they are characteristic of highly skilled ac-
tivities-a problem of the expert, not the beginner. That
seems to run contrary to common sense, since people ex-
pend a great deal of effort to acquire skills so that they will
not make mistakes. Yet, paradoxically, the probability of
making an absentminded error increases with proficiency
at a particular task. The more skilled we become at an ac-
127 Id. § 61.56(c).
128 Id. § 61.56(a).
129 Id. § 61.56(b)(1).
1so Id. § 61.56(a)(2).
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tivity, the fewer demands it makes upon consciousness.''
In fact, the author of the above quotation began by
describing the 747 collision at Tenerife as an example of a
terrible blunder by a skilled person. 3 2 As the example
shows, flying is a very specialized activity, and pilots are
susceptible to the same lapses as other specialists.
Therefore, mandating higher levels of recurrent train-
ing does not increase flight instructor control over future
nonnegligent mistakes of other pilots. The evidence sug-
gests that, for a flight instructor to reduce mistakes and
poor judgment, the instructor would have to decrease the
proficiency of the pilot. This remedy is illogical because it
contradicts the NTSB data showing that safety increases
with experience. Hence, holding a flight instructor, as an
administrator of recurrent training, liable for the mistakes
and poor judgment of the accident pilot is inappropriate.
On the whole, attribution theory cannot apply to pilot
negligence law to avert aircraft accidents caused by mis-
takes and poor judgment because no individuals are prop-
erly liable for the pilot mistakes or poor judgment that
cause aircraft accidents. The accident aircraft's pilot is
not liable because such conduct is not a negligent breach
of his or her duty of care. The only foundation of liability
in this case would be strict liability. Strict liability, how-
ever, contravenes the hypothesis because attribution the-
ory focuses on how a person consciously influences the
physical world, not on a person's unintended actions. Be-
yond that, the pilot's primary flight instructor or check
airman should not be liable due to temporal distance and
inability to control the circumstances of the unfortunate
flight. Finally, imposing liability on a flight instructor who
conducts recurrent training is unfair and unworkable be-
cause of the direct relation between pilot proficiency and
propensity for mistakes. Accordingly, the only airman
131 Reason, supra note 1, at 48.
132 Id. at 45.
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who should be answerable for an aircraft accident is the
accident pilot alone.
E. RES IpsA LOQUITUR IN PILOT NEGLIGENCE CASES
The NTSB accident data suggests that res ipsa loquitur is
not an appropriate theory to apply in general aviation pi-
lot negligence cases. First, the data shows that aircraft ac-
cidents normally occur without negligence on the part of
the pilot. Placing responsibility where it does not belong
discourages the control function of attribution theory.
Also, the issue of the defendant pilot's control of the in-
strumentality is more amorphous in aviation cases, either
because the conduct of several individuals bears on the
question of negligence or because others' conduct is com-
pletely irrelevant. Further, an improper use of the instru-
mental control requirement is inconsistent with the self-
esteem function. Hence, the nature of aviation compels
disposal of res ipsa loquitur in pilot negligence cases.
The elements of common law res ipsa loquitur are well
established.
[T]here are three conditions for the application of the
doctrine: "(1) the accident must be of a kind which ordi-
narily does not occur in the absence of someone's negli-
gence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defend-
ant; [and] (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff."'3 3
Moreover, res ipsa loquitur has permeated pilot negli-
gence law. For instance, the court in Todd v. Weikle' 34
opined that "[iln the absence of statutory authority, the
rules of law governing aviation cases are the same as those
governing ordinary negligence actions,"' 135 making res ipsa
loquitur applicable to aviation accidents. In contrast, the
,38 Newing v. Cheatham, 540 P.2d 33, 39 (Cal. 1975) (quoting Ybarra v. Span-
gard, 154 P.2d 687, 689 (Cal. 1944)).
- 376 A.2d 104 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977).
135 Id. at 109.
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court in Surface v. Johnson 13 6 took the opposite view. "We
decline to draw such inferences [of negligence] from the
mere happening of the crash, for it is a matter of common
knowledge that an aircraft may fall or crash in the absence
of negligence or fault on the part of its pilot.'
3 7
Although the Virginia Supreme Court made this state-
ment in dicta, later decisions interpret it to mean not that
aircraft may crash without negligence, but rather that res
ipsa loquitur does not apply to aircraft accidents. 3 8 As
these cases show, different courts reach opposite conclu-
sions on the same question. Apparently, courts make
both decisions with a lack of evidence of which is the ra-
tional choice. The NTSB accident data and the FARs pro-
vide helpful information in this regard.
Accident data serves to explain the proper disposition
of the first element of res ipsa loquitur. The issue is whether
pilot negligence normally causes injuries in aircraft acci-
dents. The NTSB accident data illuminate this issue. Be-
tween 1982 and 1986, there were 8721 fatal aircraft
accidents involving U.S. registered aircraft.' 3 9 The NTSB
determined that 89.4 percent of these accidents were
broadly due, at least partially, to pilot error. 4 0 However,
only 26.3 percent of accidents attributed to pilot error re-
sulted from negligent or culpable conduct on the part of
the pilot.' 4' Accordingly, only 23.4 percent of all the fatal
accidents occurring during the period occurred because
of pilot negligence.
Hence, res ipsa loquitur is not appropriate to pilot negli-
gence cases because most aircraft accidents occur without
pilot negligence. The accident data show that, when a fa-
tal aircraft accident was partially due to pilot error, there
136 214 S.E.2d 152 (Va. 1975).
1'7 Id. at 154.
138 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 671 F.2d 810, 815 (4th Cir. 1982).
139 ARAAD 1986 31 (1988); ARAAD 1985 34 (1987); ARAAD 1984 34 (1987);
ARAAD 1983 37 (1987); ARAAD 1982 37 (1986).
140 Id.
141 ARAAD 1986 86-150 (1988); ARAAD 1985 177-233 (1987); ARAAD 1984
179-231 (1987); ARAAD 1983 202-247 (1987); ARAAD 1982 205-245 (1986).
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is less than one chance in three that pilot negligence
caused the accident. Furthermore, in any fatal accident,
chances are less than one in four that pilot negligence
caused the injuries. There is no place for inferences of
pilot negligence in a tort system wherein proof is based
on a preponderance of the evidence. Even considering
potential analytical error, the data analysis would need an
error margin of over 100 percent for pilot negligence to
be more probable than not. Putting responsibility where
it does not probably belong discourages the principle that
pilots may control the consequences of accidents and liti-
gation. Thus, aircraft accidents do normally happen in the
absence of pilot negligence, and the first element of res
ipsa loquitur does not apply.
The second element of res ipsa loquitur, that of exclusive
control of the agency or instrumentality by the defendant,
also raises issues particular to pilot negligence. Plainly,
this element addresses whether it was indeed the defend-
ant who breached a duty of care, and not some other, pos-
sibly unknown, individual. In general aviation, this issue
particularly arises in two situations: when it is not certain
that the defendant pilot was actually flying the aircraft,
and when the defendant was not aboard the aircraft.
The first scenario appears when the accident aircraft
has two sets of flight controls. In many general aviation
aircraft, two occupants have before them, within conve-
nient reach, the mechanical controls necessary to operate
the aircraft. Consequently, when such an aircraft crashes
and all aboard perish, a question emerges as to who flew
the aircraft. Although the pilot in command customarily
occupies a particular seat, the conclusion that the pilot in
command was flying at the time of impact does not auto-
matically follow.
Nonetheless, courts have fashioned rules to apply to
this situation. If the front seat occupants were both pilots,
then the issue of control is not ascertainable.
Regardless of which one of the decedents may have been
operating the plane the other could have taken some ac-
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tion which precipitated the difficulty. Any conclusion we
draw must be based upon surmise and conjecture ...
The finding of negligence is immaterial until we can deter-
mine the identity of the person to be charged with respon-
sibility for the negligence. 142
However, when only one pilot is within reach of the con-
trols, then there may be a presumption that the pilot was
actually in control of the aircraft. The fact that a passen-
ger occupies a seat provided with controls does not, by
itself, mean that the aircraft was not under the exclusive
control of the pilot.'4 3 Hence, legal rules exist to address
the issue of dual aircraft controls.
A more obvious issue regarding the second element
arises when the pilot defendant was not aboard the air-
craft when it crashed. The court in Lejeune v. Collard 144
addressed this issue. Lejeune was a student pilot who
crashed while flying solo. Collard, Lejeune's flight in-
structor, was on the ground at the time of the accident.
The court held that
[t]he doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has no application in this
case because of the fact that the accident might have oc-
curred through the negligence of the pilot, Lejeune....
The air plane and the resultant unfortunate accident was
[sic] under the control and knowledge of the plaintiff and
not the defendant.'
45
Thus, the significant question in this type of case is
whether the defendant could possibly have exercised con-
trol over the instrumentality. If not, res ipsa loquitur cannot
apply.
While the foregoing rules regarding the second ele-
ment of res ipsa loquitur are reasonable and equitable, they
are superseded by the FARs. "The pilot in command of
an aircraft is directly responsible for ... the operation of
142 Mitchell v. Eyre, 12 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,880, 17,883-84 (Neb. 1973).
113 Ayer v. Boyle, 37 Cal. App. 3d 882, 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974); accord Newing
v. Cheatham, 540 P.2d at 33, 41 (Cal. 1975).
144 44 So. 2d 504 (La. Ct. App. 1950).
145 Id. at 508-09.
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that aircraft."'146 Again, the FARs have the force and ef-
fect of law.' 47 The Supreme Court of Minnesota elo-
quently explained this provision:
The civil air regulations do not, and cannot, establish rules
for the imposition of liability. However, they do impose
duties and responsibilities which, in effect, specify the
standard of care that is imposed upon the pilot in com-
mand, which, in turn, is employed by common-law negli-
gence principles in defining negligence. Thus, the rule
applicable to aircraft is that if the aircraft is operated in a
negligent manner the pilot in command is negligent re-
gardless of whether or not he is at the controls at the
time-at least in the absence of extenuating circumstances
such as sudden illness. This surely imposes a high duty
and heavy burden upon the pilot in command of aircraft.
However, the duty is commensurate with the skills re-
quired and the perils incurred. We take judicial notice of
the difference between air traffic and travel by rail, high-
way, and canal. The speed, the variable three-dimensional
movement of aircraft in flight, the complexity of instru-
mentation and controls, the necessity for constant vigi-
lance, and the ever-present threat of disaster in case of
accident all require higher skills, greater precautions, and
heavier responsibilities to constitute due care in the opera-
tion of aircraft than in the operation of land or water vehi-
cles. These considerations make it appropriate that the
pilot in command have complete authority to control the
operation of the aircraft in flight and that he have corre-
sponding responsibility. 48
Accordingly, the one and only pilot in command of an air-
craft is responsible regardless of whether the pilot in com-
mand was manipulating the controls at the time of the
accident. Further, the pilot-in-command rule logically ex-
cludes any pilots not present in the accident aircraft.
Hence, judicial massaging of the second element of res ipsa
loquitur is both unnecessary and improper.
146 14 C.F.R. § 91.3 (1992).
,41 Wood v. United States, 14 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,821, 17,823 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
148 Lange v. Nelson-Ryan Flight Serv., Inc., 108 N.W.2d 428, 432-33 (Minn.
1961).
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Also, the pilot-in-command rule is consistent with the
attribution hypothesis. An obvious consequence of a pilot
taking to the air is control of an aircraft. The pilot-in-
command rule puts responsibility and authority in the
same place as control, with the pilot. The rule addition-
ally supports the self-esteem function. Under the Health
Belief Model, pilots tend to act in their own best interest.
The pilot-in-command rule tells pilots that their best in-
terest is to act to the benefit of flight safety. Therefore,
the pilot-in-command rule should dominate over the sec-
ond element of res ipsa loquitur.
In summary, res ipsa loquitur is not an appropriate doc-
trine for pilot negligence actions. Actual accident data
supports the conclusion that aircraft accidents normally
occur in the absence of pilot negligence. Besides, the sec-
ond element of the doctrine is effectively bypassed in the
face of the pilot-in-command rule. Hence, the only sensi-
ble solution is to remove res ipsa loquitur from the field of
pilot negligence law.
F. STRICT LIABILITY IN GENERAL AVIATION
The final principle bearing on pilot negligence law is
aviation strict liability. This concept emerged during the
infancy of aviation, when flying was more thrilling than
practical. Yet, strict liability lives on today. Nevertheless,
strict liability should be stricken for three reasons. First,
the original justification for strict liability departed long
ago. Second, strict liability works to make state law inter-
nally inconsistent. Third, strict liability contravenes attri-
bution theory, and thus reduces safety.
Unlike the deep traditions of American law, aviating be-
gan in this century mostly as a diversionary sport.
In the early days of aviation, the cases and treatises were
replete with references to the hazards of "aeroplanes."
The following assessment is typical: "[E]ven the best con-
structed and maintained aeroplane is so incapable of com-
plete control that flying creates a risk that the plane even
though carefully constructed, maintained and operated,
11311993]
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may crash to the injury of persons, structures and chattels
on the land over which the flight is made." RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF TORTS, § 520, comment b (1938). As colorfully
stated in Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 78, at 556 (5th
ed. 1984): "Flying was of course regarded at first as a
questionable and highly dangerous enterprise, the prov-
ince exclusively of venturesome fools."' 49
In 1922 the Commission on Uniform Laws proposed
the Uniform Aeronautics Act, which made aircraft owners
strictly liable for all ground damage caused by aircraft. 5 °
Additionally, the First Restatement of Torts regarded avi-
ation as an ultrahazardous activity.
An activity is ultrahazardous if it necessarily involves a risk
of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of others
which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost
care, and is not a matter of common usage. 15
Thus, based on the points quoted above, the Restatement
commented that "aviation in its present stage of develop-
ment is ultrahazardous.'1 52 Through 1938, then, the law
regarded aviation as an uncommon activity, full of unmiti-
gable risk.
This attitude persisted notwithstanding the advance of
technology. Ultimately, twenty-three states adopted the
Uniform Aeronautics Act. 15 Moreover, the Second Re-
statement of Torts allotted a section to aviation strict
liability:
If physical harm to land or to persons or chattels on the
ground is caused by the ascent, descent or flight of air-
craft, or by the dropping or falling of an object from the
aircraft, the operator of the aircraft is subject to liability
for the harm, even though he has exercised the utmost
care to prevent it, and the owner of the aircraft is subject
to similar liability if he has authorized or permitted the
149 Crosby v. Cox Aircraft Co., 746 P.2d 1198, 1200 (Wash. 1987) (citations
omitted).
150 Il
151 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 520 (1938).
15 Id. cmt. b.
15 Crosby, 746 P.2d at 1200.
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operation. ' 54
Thus, even in the years following moon landings and su-
personic transports, some did not consider'aviation as an
everyday activity.
This view has been largely rejected though. By 1943,
the Commission on Uniform Laws regarded the Uniform
Aeronautics Act as obsolete. 55 Today, there are appar-
ently only five states with aviation strict liability statutes in
force: Delaware, 156  Hawaii, 157  Minnesota, 58  New
Jersey, 59 and South Carolina. 16  Also, these statutes ap-
ply only to aircraft owners; pilots are liable only for dam-
ages caused by their own negligence.' 6' Strict liability,
however, is still relevant to pilot negligence because many
pilots own their aircraft, and the second Restatement still
professes the doctrine against operators. Thus, strict lia-
bility provides another theory in litigation against pilots.
Nevertheless, the justification for strict liability is de-
funct. The NTSB accident records clearly show that gen-
eral aviation is not ultrahazardous. While accumulating
628,396,321 flight hours over twenty years, there have
been only 12,411 fatal general aviation aircraft acci-
dents. 62 These figures reduce to a rate of 1.98 fatal acci-
dents per 100,000 flight hours. Statistically, an individual
would have to be airborne for 5.76 years before dying in a
general aviation aircraft accident. Moreover, the fatal ac-
cident rate for air carrier operations is even lower. 63
15 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520A (1977).
1-5 Crosby, 746 P.2d at 1200.
-" DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 305 (1990).
157 HAW. REV. STAT. § 263-5 (1991).
'8 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 360.012 (West 1991).
159 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 6:2-7 (West 1991).
1- S.C. CODE ANN. § 55-3-60 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
161 Crosby, 746 P.2d at 1200.
-62 ARAAD 1988 3 (1991); ARAAD 1986 3 (1988); ARAAD 1981 2 (1984);
ARAAD 1978 2 (1980); ARAAD 1976 2 (1976); ARAAD 1974 3 (1978); ARAAD
1973 2-3 (1975); ARAAD 1972 3 (1974); ARAAD 1970 11 (1974).
163 Rate of Carrier Accidents Reduced Sharply in 1980, 14 AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., Jan. 26, 1981, at 80.
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Therefore, aviation is no longer just a pastime for a few
venturesome fools.
Next, state statutes that impose strict liability conflict
with state common law. New Jersey is one of the states
that hangs onto strict liability.' 64 However, under New
Jersey law, violations of the FARs are only evidence of
negligence. 165 Thus, if a pilot is the owner of the accident
aircraft, and the pilot violated a safety regulation con-
tained in the FARs, then the pilot is not necessarily liable
in negligence for ignoring safety regulations, but defi-
nitely is liable under the strict liability statute. Presuma-
bly, the statute is in place because the state legislature
considers aircraft unsafe. Yet, when a pilot/owner vio-
lates a regulation enacted to increase safety, there is no
negligence as a matter of law. Because this conflict can-
not be resolved, strict liability is not appropriate for pilot
negligence law.
Additionally, strict liability contravenes attribution the-
ory. Pilot negligence rules should provide realistic and
achievable goals within the locus of control of pilots. In
contrast, strict liability targets individuals regardless of
whether the blameworthy agents were within the loci of
control of those individuals. Hence, strict liability offers
no incentives to eliminate negligent conduct.
To summarize, aviation strict liability is not a viable
legal principle. From any viewpoint, general aviation is
no longer an uncommon and hazardous activity. State
common law recognizes this fact, but statutory strict liabil-
ity does not. Furthermore, strict liability contributes
nothing to the quest for greater safety, but tends the other
way, to keep aviation dangerous. Hence, it is an anti-
quated doctrine that needs a funeral.
IV. CONCLUSION
Alterations to pilot negligence law are necessary to mir-
16 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 6:2-7 (West 1991).
165 Rodriguez v. United States, 823 F.2d 735, 739-40 (3d Cir. 1987).
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ror general aviation practice and to decrease accidents.
Pilot negligence law should retain negligence per se and
the standard of the ordinarily prudent pilot but in modi-
fied forms. Conversely, pilot negligence law should dis-
card res ipsa loquitur, liability of instructors and check
airmen for the mistakes or poor judgment of other pilots,
and statutory strict liability.
It is clear that negligence per se should apply to all FARs
that concern the actual operation of aircraft. All opera-
tional regulations enhance safety. Greater safety means
fewer accidents and personal injuries. Pilot negligenceper
se should not, however, be limitless. The FARs rightfully
give the pilot in command the option to deviate from the
FARs in time of emergency. Also, a rule of strict con-
struction should predominate. Overall, if everyone knows
and follows the FARs, flight safety benefits.
Likewise, pilot negligence per se should expand to en-
compass the AIM and advisory circulars. The AIM and
advisory circulars are terrific sources of prudent and ap-
proved safety practices. Moreover, they are potentially in-
corporated by reference into the FARs. Thus, the
expansion of negligence per se to these publications will
further increase safety.
Next, in any general aviation pilot negligence case, the
legal standard of care should be the ordinarily prudent
private pilot who has 500 hours total experience and 100
hours in type. Pilots having at least this level of skill are
substantially less prone to aircraft accidents. Beyond that,
this standard of care is precisely defined and is not so high
as to be out of the reach of most pilots. If all pilots were
to fly as well as the minimum standard, accident
probability would diminish.
Pilot skill notwithstanding, res ipsa loquitur is not an ap-
propriate method of determining breach of duty. History
shows that aircraft accidents simply do not usually occur
as a. result of pilot negligence. Further, the FARs implic-
itly reject the doctrine by shouldering the pilot in com-
mand with the responsibility for the flight. In short, res
19931 1135
1136 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [58
ipsa loquitur does not fit within the realities of general avia-
tion. Therefore, courts should dispose of the doctrine in
pilot negligence cases.
Similarly, pilot negligence law should abandon any con-
cept of finding liability for the mistakes or poor judgment
of the accident pilot. First, the pilot should not be liable
in the absence of negligence. Moreover, flight instructors
and check airmen, who were outside the cockpit but none-
theless may be responsible for contributing to the pilot
error, cannot be liable. They have no control over the er-
rant actions, cannot predict the future years distant and
cannot eliminate absentminded lapses by closer scrutiny
of students and applicants. The best solution to combat
mistakes and poor judgment is for pilots to pay attention
in the air. No alternate theory of liability will change that
duty.
Last, aviation strict liability is an anachronism. Aviation
has evolved from a pioneering adventure into a legitimate
instrument of travel and commerce. Evidently, it evolved
more quickly than the law. In addition, strict liability does
not promote flight safety because it is only a reaction to
all the miscues of pilots. The attribution theory hypothe-
sis supposes that pilots can modify their behavior to avoid
accidents. In contrast, strict liability acts as a reactive
punishment, not a proactive motivator. As such, pilots
could well believe that exercise of the utmost care does
not prevent imposition of liability. Hence, no motivation
exists to associate care with nonliability. Consequently,
strict liability in pilot negligence law changes the results
of litigation but not pilots' attitudes regarding safety.
Finally, what went wrong in the 747 collision at Tener-
ife? During the six years preceding the incident, the cap-
tain of the departing aircraft worked principally as an
instructor in flight simulators. To save time and costs,
simulator controllers never instructed pilots to hold on
the runway. When the fateful time came, the captain did
not wait for his takeoff clearance. He performed with skill
and expertise, in a way he had practiced many times. Un-
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fortunately, his actions were not appropriate to the
situation. 166
The goals of pilots and the law include greater personal
safety in general aviation. Pilots achieve safety through
the wisdom of experience. Aviation has accrued a great
deal of experience over the past decades. Therefore, the
legal system would be wise to tap into it.
16 Reason, supra note 1, at 49.
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APPENDIX A: ACCIDENT DATA ANALYSIS
A substantial amount of information is available for
studying general aviation aircraft accidents. The NTSB
compiles and publishes data in statistical reports. I cate-
gorized the sources of error that result in general aviation
accidents and analyzed the statistical data in the hope of
discerning patterns or relationships among the accidents.
Also, I reduced data to study accidents as a function of
total hours flown by general aviation aircraft, accidents as
a function of overall pilot experience, accidents as a func-
tion of pilot experience with the make and model of the
accident aircraft, accidents as a function of the certifica-
tion of the pilot and accidents as categorized by the causes
and factors contributing to those accidents. Although the
analyses are somewhat imperfect, they provide interesting
and important information.
NTSB accident data are very useful in the study of gen-
eral aviation accidents. The NTSB publishes annual com-
pilations of general aviation accident data. The reported
accidents include all those involving U.S. registered civil
aircraft not engaged in air carrier revenue operations. 67
An accident occurs when, as a result of the operation of
an aircraft, a person receives serious or fatal injuries, or
an aircraft receives substantial damage.' 6 Each annual
review contains various statistical data in tabular formats
for accidents occurring during that calendar year. Data
categories include kinds of aircraft, such as fixed or rotary
wing, and kinds of flying, such as personal or business, as
well as data for all operations.' 69 The reports also furnish
accident causes and contributing factors. 70
This study utilizes accident data from the twenty calen-
dar years 1969 through 1988. There are several reasons
for using this block of years. First, 1988 is the most recent
published year. Next, twenty years is a substantial time
167 ARAAD 1985 1 (1987). This definition is typical of all the reports.
M6 ARAAD 1985 58 (1991).
169 See, e.g., ARAAD 1988 4 (1991).
170 See, e.g., id. at 61-72.
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interval; during those years, general aviation aircraft flew
over 628 million flight hours.' 7' Also, the NTSB changed
the standard definition of aircraft accident in 1968, mak-
ing previous data incompatible. 172 Finally, the data from
year to year is very consistent. For instance, a total of
74,655 accidents occurred during the twenty year pe-
riod.' 73 The average number of accidents per year is
3733, and the standard deviation is only 806.' 74 Likewise,
12,411 fatal accidents occurred during the period, yield-
ing an average of 621 per year with a standard deviation
of 100.175 Hence, the years 1969 through 1988 comprise
an adequate group of data.
Unfortunately, not all of the data are usable all of the
time. The NTSB changed its reporting format several
times over the years, eliminating some forms of data and
adding others. As a result, some of the reports do not
provide the information required for this study. The con-
sequence is that many of the specific analyses use only a
portion of the calendar years of the entire span. All ad-
justments made are detailed below.
Also, the statistics for each year contain some accidents
that are due to sabotage or attempted suicide. The per-
'7, ARAAD 1988 5 (1991); ARAAD 1987 5 (1989); ARAAD 1986 5 (1988);
ARAAD 1976 2 (1978); ARAAD 1974 3 (1976); ARAAD 1973 3 (1975); ARAAD
1972 3 (1974); ARAAD 1970 11 (1974).
172 ARAAD 1969 vii (1971).
173 ARAAD 1988 3 (1991); ARAAD 1986 3 (1988); ARAAD 1981 2 (1984);
ARAAD 1978 2 (1980); ARAAD 1976 2 (1978); ARAAD 1974 3 (1976); ARAAD
1973 3 (1975); ARAAD 1972 3 (1974); ARAAD 1970 11 (1974).
174 Standard deviation measures the dispersion of statistical samples about the
samples' arithmetic mean. Samples of similar data generally form a bell-shaped
"normal" curve of distributions about the mean. In such a case, 68% of the sam-
ples lie within one standard deviation of the mean, and 95% lie within two stan-
dard deviations of the mean. For more discussion of standard deviation, see OVID
W. ESHBACH & MOTr SOUDERS, HANDBOOK OF ENGINEERING FUNDAMENTALS 245-
47 (1975); HERMAN J. LOETHER & DONALD G. McTAvISH, DESCRIPTIVE AND INFER-
ENTIAL STATISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION 149-53 (1980); see infra Appendix B for the
calculation of the average numbers of accidents and standard deviation.
.71 ARAAD 1988 3 (1991); ARAAD 1986 3 (1988); ARAAD 1981 2 (1984);
ARAAD 1978 2 (1980); ARAAD 1976 2 (1978); ARAAD 1974 3 (1976); ARAAD
1973 3 (1975); ARAAD 1972 3 (1974); ARAAD 1970 I (1974); see infra Appendix
B for this calculation.
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centage of accidents due to suicide or sabotage, however,
is small. Since 1974, such acts account for only .035% of
the accident total.' 76 Hence, suicide and sabotage are not
sufficiently common to affect the analyses.
Where possible, this study focuses on accidents result-
ing in serious or fatal injuries. The NTSB utilizes four
categories of injury: fatal, serious, minor, and none.' 77
This is known as the accident's injury index and refers to
the most serious personal injury sustained in the- acci-
dent. 78 A fatal injury is an injury that results in death
within 30 days of the accident. 79 A serious injury is
[a]ny injury which 1) requires hospitalization for more
than 48 hours, commencing within 7 days from the date
the injury was received; 2) results in a fracture of any bone
(except simple fractures of fingers, toes, or nose); 3) in-
volves lacerations which cause severe hemorrhages, nerve,
muscle, or tendon damage; 4) involves injury to any inter-
nal organ; or 5) involves second- or third-degree bums, or
any burns affecting more than 5 percent of body
surface.' 80
This study does not use accidents involving only minor
injuries.
The first analysis studies all accidents involving general
aviation aircraft, utilizing data from all twenty calendar
years. Each annual report contains data on total hours
flown, total number of accidents total number of serious
accidents and total number of fatal accidents.'' For each
year, calculations determine the percentage of total acci-
dents that are fatal accidents and the percentage of total
accidents that are either serious or fatal. In addition, cal-
culations determine accident rates for total accidents, fatal
accidents and serious or fatal accidents. The accident
176 ARAAD 1988 18 (1991); ARAAD 1983 31 (1987); ARAAD 1979 23 (1981);
ARAAD 1975 15 (1977).
17 ARAAD 1988 21 (1991).
178 Id. at 58.
179 Id.
" Id. at 59.
1, See, e.g., id. at 3-5.
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rates are based on numbers of occurrences per 100,000
flight hours. 82 This analysis is useful in obtaining a
global view of the statistics and for discerning trends in
general aviation safety.
The next study analyzes the relation between aircraft
accidents and the total flight experience of the pilot in
command of the accident aircraft. This study uses data
from all compilations except 1971, which is not available.
It includes data for accidents of all types and data for all
fatal accidents.8 3 The tabular format of the annual re-
views presents numbers of accidents for pilots within cer-
tain ranges of experience, for example, 0-50 hours, 50-
100 hours and so on.18 4
The experience intervals are not all the same size, but a
correction allows comparison of them. The number of ac-
cidents attributable to a given experience interval is di-
vided by the number of fifty hour sub-intervals contained
in the experience interval. For example, the number of
accidents occurring in the 100-500 hour interval is di-
vided by 8, because 500 minus 100 equals 400, and 400
divided by 50 equals 8. This correction assumes, of
course, that pilot experience levels and accidents are
evenly distributed within the intervals.
Also, the last experience interval, those pilots with
greater than 10,000 hours' experience, is not usable. The
interval is not bounded on its upper end. Thus, there is
no ascertainable number of fifty hour intervals to divide
into the number of accidents. However, the number of
accidents in this group, and probably the number of pi-
lots, are small.
The total flight experience analysis has some limita-
tions. First, it requires the assumption of even distribu-
tion of pilots and accidents throughout an experience
interval. Unfortunately, the NTSB data are not more il-
182 Accident rates are typically based on 100,000 flight hours. See, e.g., ARAAD
1988 4 (1991); see infra Appendix B for detailed data.
183 See, e.g., ARAAD 1988 30, 39 (1991).
18 See, e.g., id.
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lustrative. Second, the group of pilots with more than
10,000 hours is unbounded and hence unusable. Third,
there is no way to determine how many pilots are in any
given group of experience. Thus, it is impossible to de-
termine what percentage of pilots in a group are involved
in accidents. Fourth, no data shows how much flight time
each group amasses during a given year, rendering the
calculation of accident rates impossible. Finally, the expe-
rience of the pilot in command for some accidents is unre-
ported, so the data set is facially incomplete.
The data analysis also explores relations between air-
craft accidents and time in type of the pilot in com-
mand. "'85 Like the total experience analysis, data are
available for both total and fatal accidents but are more
limited. Fatal accident data are published for the years
1969 through 1979 only, and the last unbounded interval
begins at 3000 hours. Data on total accidents by time in
type are available for all the years except 1980 and 1981.
The more recent annual data are usable up to 10,000
hours. The data reduction is identical to the total experi-
ence analysis, except that the bounded intervals for the
earlier years end at 3000 hours. Consequently, this analy-
sis has the same limitations as the accidents versus total
experience analysis.
Next is the analysis regarding aircraft accidents in terms
of the type of pilot certificate held by the pilot in com-
mand. Based on the FARs, the NTSB data sets recognize
seven discreet types of pilot certificate: student pilot, pri-
vate pilot, commercial pilot, airline transport pilot, private
pilot and certified flight instructor, commercial pilot and
certified flight instructor, and airline transport pilot and
certified flight instructor.' 86 The annual data available for
this study runs from 1971 to 1979; no data are reported
after 1979; and the 1969 and 1970 data are not presented
in a comparable format.
The pilot certificate study has three limitations. First,
185 See, e.g., id.
186 See, e.g., ARAAD 1979 102 (1982).
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less than half of the twenty years of accident reviews are
usable. Second, the certificate of the pilot of the accident
aircraft is unknown in a small percentage of cases. Third,
the total numbers of pilots holding each type of certificate
are unknown and probably not ascertainable due to turn-
over of pilots from year to year. Hence, it is impossible to
determine the accident propensities of different types of
pilots.
The last analysis studies the types of pilot error that
caused or contributed to the accidents during the period.
The NTSB assigns to each accident probable causes and
contributing factors.18 7
The objective is to ascertain those cause and effect rela-
tionships in the accident sequence about which something
can be done to prevent recurrence of the type of accident
under consideration. Accordingly, for statistical purposes,
where two or more causes exist in an accident, each is re-
corded and no attempt is made to establish a primary
cause .... The term "factor" is used, in general, to denote
those elements of an accident that further explain or sup-
plement the probable cause(s) ... .
For the years 1982 through 1986, the NTSB utilizes a de-
tailed and comprehensive categorization of causes and
factors. 8 9 This categorization uses several echelons of
causes and factors, the major headings being aircraft, en-
vironment, human performance, and direct underlying
cause factors. 90
Regrettably, the other annual reports are not so useful.
Data before 1982 are reported in completely different and
unmanageable formats, and, after 1986, statistics on fatal
accidents are neither segregated from total accidents nor
separated in terms of pilot mistake or disregard. In con-
trast, the format of the 1982 through 1986 data allows an
analysis of causes and factors in serious and fatal acci-
187 See, e.g., ARRAD 1988 61-72 (1991).
188 ARAAD 1983 173 (1987).
189 See, e.g., id. at 180-247.
190 Id.
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dents. Thus, for the years 1982 through 1986, the study
explores the prevalence of pilot negligence in accidents
resulting in serious or fatal injuries.
Extracting evidence of pilot negligence from causes and
factors is a substantial effort. The goal is to separate the
listed causes and factors into those that indicate pilot dis-
regard from those that indicate poor judgment or mis-
takes. Pilot disregard of safe practices include those
causes that actually state that the pilot disregarded some-
thing. Also included are pilot tasks poorly performed on
the ground, such as flight planning, when the pilot has
plenty of time to do the task properly. Additionally, acci-
dents that a pilot could avoid by canceling the flight alto-
gether show pilot disregard, such as when the pilot takes
off into bad weather. Lastly, pilot disregard includes vio-
lations of the FARs. Overall, when deciding whether to
place a cause or factor in the pilot disregard set or not, I
tried to be as objective as possible.
Once the major separation is complete, data reduction
is similar to the other analyses. The first step is to deter-
mine, for those accidents in which at least one cause or
factor is attributed to human performance, the percentage
of fatal accidents that are due, at least in part, to pilot dis-
regard. Then, by applying that percentage to the percent-
age of all fatal accidents blamed on pilot error, it is
possible to discern the percentage of all fatal accidents
that are arguably due to pilot negligence.
Although finding the prevalence of pilot negligence is a
significant result, the analysis is necessarily imprecise.
Each annual listing of human performance causes and fac-
tors is approximately fifty pages long and contains hun-
dreds of subcategories of human error. Each of those
subcategories is either of the misjudgment class or the
disregard class. For many, it is difficult to determine the
proper classification because many subcategory descrip-
tions are short, general, and not self-explanatory. Conse-
quently, the results of this particular study are, at best, a
[58
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gross estimate of the prevalence of pilot negligence in
general aviation accidents.
Overall, the NTSB data do not yield complete answers
to the questions relevant here, but are nevertheless illumi-
nating. Information relating to total accidents and total
hours flown by general aviation aircraft is consistently
available. Information on accidents versus pilot total ex-
perience and experience in type is likewise available, but
restricted due to lack of data concerning the distribution
of the pilot population. Information regarding accidents
as a function of pilot certificate is similarly restricted. Fi-
nally, the most important analysis, that of measuring pilot
negligence in aircraft accidents, is really an educated
guess. Still, the NTSB data are the best available and do
provide answers to significant questions.
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APPENDIX B: ANNUAL ACCIDENT TOTALS
Total Accident
Total Hours Rate/100k
Year Flown Total Accidents Hours
1969 25,350,675 4767 18.80
1970 26,030,414 4712 18.10
1971 25,512,000 4648 18.22
1972 26,974,000 4256 15.77
1973 30,048,000 4255 14.16
1974 32,474,608 4425 13.63
1975 34,164,993 4237 12.40
1976 36,127,631 4193 11.61
1977 31,578,000 4286 13.57
1978 34,887,000 4494 12.88
1979 38,641,000 3825 9.90
1980 36,402,000 3597 9.88
1981 36,803,000 3502 9.52
1982 32,095,000 3233 10.07
1983 31,048,000 3075 9.90
1984 31,510,000 3010 9.55
1985 30,590,000 2741 8.96
1986 29,318,000 2581 8.80
1987 29,208,000 2464 8.44
1988 29,634,000 2354 7.94
Total 628,396,321 74655
Average 31,419,816 3732.75 11.88
s 806.21
s = standard deviation
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Total Serious
or Fatal
Year Accidents
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1980
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1038
1029
1070
1081
1118
1161
1094
1117
1126
1251
1012
1022
1003
929
874
891
804
789
721
735
Total
Average
s
19865
993.25
148.41
Serious or
Fatal Rate/
100k Hours
4.10
3.95
4.19
4.01
3.72
3.58
3.20
3.09
3.57
3.59
2.62
2.81
2.73
2.90
2.82
2.83
2.63
2.69
2.47
2.48
3.16
Percent of
Total Accidents
21.6
21.8
23.0
25.4
26.3
26.2
25.8
26.6
26.3
27.8
26.5
28.7
28.6
28.7
28.4
29.6
29.3
30.6
29.3
30.6
26.6
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